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Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege • Patient's Dangerous Condition
- Confidentiality. Legal Duty to Warn Potential Victim
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,
13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974)p ROSENJIT PODDAR HAD COME to the United States from India to pursue
graduate studies at the University of California at Berkeley. While
attending the University of California, Poddar met and became infatuated with
Miss Tatiana Tarasoff. However, Miss Tarasoff did not return Poddar's
affection and as a result of her rejection, Poddar became extremely depressed;
neglected his appearance, studies, and health; spoke disjointedly, and often
wept.1 It was in this mental state that Poddar sought psychiatric aid at the
Cowell Memorial Hospital, at the University of California. During therapy,
Poddar confided to Dr. Moore, a psychologist, his intention to kill Tatiana
upon her return from South America.2 Dr. Moore's attempt to have Poddar
confined for treatment failed when the campus police released him on his
promise to stay away from Tatiana. After this attempt to have Poddar
confined, he ceased all treatment at the hospital;3 and upon Tatiana's return
to Berkeley, went to her apartment, and killed her.'
Tatiana's parents, as plaintiffs, brought this wrongful death action against
the University regents, doctors, and campus police.' The plaintiffs alleged
liability both for failure to confine Poddar and for failure to warn them of the
danger confronting their daughter.6 The Court of Appeals, First District,
Division One affirmed the Superior Court for Alameda County in its dismissal
of both causes of action.' The Supreme Court of California affirmed the court
of appeals as to the dismissal of the first contention of liability, predicated
upon the defendants' failure to confine Poddar, on the theory of statutory
immunity.8 However, the dismissal of the second ground for liability, based
' People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 518 P.2d 342, 111 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1974) (report of
the criminal prosecution).
2 529 P.2d 553, 554, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 130 (1974).
3 Id. at 555, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
4 People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 518 P.2d 342, 111 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1974).
5 529 P.2d at 554, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
6 ld.
7 Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 33 Cal. App. 3d 275, 108 Cal. Rptr.
878 (1973), vacated, 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974).
8 529 P.2d at 563, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 139. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 856(a) (West 1966)
declares that: "Neither a public entity nor a public employee acting within the scope of
his employment is liable for any injury resulting from determining in accordance with
any applicable enactment: (1) Whether to confine a person for mental illness or
addiction .. " The therapist's power to confine Poddar, as specified in CAL. WELF. &
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upon the defendants' negligence in failing to warn plaintiffs of the danger
confronting their daughter, was reversed.' The court, in sustaining this cause
of action, stated that:
When a doctor or a psychotherapist, in the exercise of his professional
skill and knowledge, determines, or should determine, that a warning
is essential to avert danger arising from the medical or psychological
condition of his patient, he incurs a legal obligation to give that
warning."0 (emphasis added).
The court fashioned this duty from the two exceptions to the common
law rule that a person has no duty to warn those endangered by the conduct of
another.'1 One exception had been designed to apply in situations where a
special relationship exists between the defendant and either the person whose
conduct is to be controlled or the foreseeable victim. 2 The court strongly
emphasized that the relationship between the therapist and the patient was
sufficient to support a duty to warn the potential victim, and that the lack of a
special relationship between the therapist and the victim would not detract from
such an obligation." The court expressly declared that the psychotherapist-
patient relationship is a sufficient foundation for imposing upon a therapist or
doctor "a duty to use reasonable care to give threatened persons such warnings
as are essential to avert foreseeable danger arising from his patient's condition
or treatment.""4 However, Justice Clark, citing social policy that confidentiality
should be fostered between the psychiatrist and his patient, dissented to the
application of legal duty imposed purely on this relationship."
The second exception to the common law rule applies where the defendant
has "undertaken to engage in affirmative action to control the anticipated
INST'NS CODE § 5201 (West 1972) places the therapists within the protection of CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 856(a) (West 1966). See 529 P.2d at 563 n. 17, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 139
n. 17.
The police officers' immunity stems from CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5154
(West 1972) which states: "The professional person in charge of the facility providing
72 hour treatment and evaluation, his designee, and the peace officer responsible for the
detainment of the person shall not be held civilly or criminally liable for any action by a
person released at or before the end of 72 hours." See 529 P.2d at 565, 118 Cal. Rptr.
at 141.
9 529 P.2d at 555, 556, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 131, 132. For absence of statutory immunity for
negligent failure to warn see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1966), as construed in
Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968). See also
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.8 (West 1966).
10 529 P.2d at 555, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
1I id. at 557, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
12 Id. While the majority states that both of these exceptions are applicable to defendant
psychotherapist, the foundation for defendant policemen's liability is unclear. 529 P.2d at
569, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (Clark, J., dissenting).
13 id. at 558, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 134. 14 Id. at 559, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
15 Id. at 566-69, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 142-45.
[Vol. 9:1
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 9 [1976], Iss. 1, Art. 11
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss1/11
Summer, 1975]
dangerous conduct of the patient or protect the prospective victim." The
Supreme Court of California also found that the breach of duty to warn arose
solely from the policy of this exception to the common law rule. Both
the majority and the dissent agreed that defendants' "bungled attempt" to
confine Poddar may have deterred him from seeking further therapy and
thereby increased the danger to Tatiana."7
In placing a legal duty to warn on the psychotherapist, the California
supreme court followed the modern trend in tort law by recognizing the
subordination of the patient's interest in the confidentiality of the psychother-
apist-patient relationship to both the public interest, and to what the court
determines to be the patient's own best interest."8 Under these confined
circumstances the therapist acquires a limited right to disclose pertinent
information to any person who may have a legitimate interest in his patient's
health.' However, certain restrictive guidelines have been placed on the
disclosure of such information. In Berry v. Moench,'- the Utah supreme court
required that: (a) the therapist use good faith and reasonable care to tell the
truth; (b) the information be reported fairly; (c) only necessary information
be given; and, (d) publication be limited to those persons necessary for
protection of the threatened interest. -1
For many years, the therapist had harbored a right to breach the duty to
remain silent concerning his patient's in-session revelations when the interests
16 Id. at 557, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 133. 17 Id. at 559, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
I Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 800 (N.D. Ohio, 1965)
wherein it is stated: "We recognize that the right of privacy and duty of secrecy are
limited by the considerations of public policy. We do not recognize an absolute
privilege .. " (italics theirs); In re Lifshutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr.
829 (1970), wherein the California Supreme Court states: "[A]lthough all compelled
disclosures may interfere to some extent with an individual's performance of his work,
such requirements have been universally upheld so long as the compelled disclosure is
reasonable in light of a related and important governmental purpose ... [A]Ul state
interest with confidentiality is not prohibited." Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d
345 (1962) (holding the patient possesses a limited right against extrajudicial dis-
closures). See generally Note, Psychotherapy and Griswold: Is Confidence a Privilege or
a Right? 3 CONN. L. Rv. 599 (1971); Note, Medical Practice and the Right to Privacy,
43 MINN. L. REV. 943, 955 (1959).
' Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d
191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958) wherein it is stated: "[Where life, safety, well-being or
other important interest is in jeopardy, one having information which could protect
against the hazard, may have a conditional privilege to reveal information for such
purpose, even though it be defamatory and may prove to be false."
20 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958).
21 Id. See Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62
CAL. L. REv. 1025, 1065 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fleming & Maximov] which lists
similar criteria including: (a) the necessity of a second opinion before the warning is
given to the potential victim; (b) no action be taken until the danger is truly eminent;
(c) the course of action which is least harmful to the patient be taken; and, (d) that the
therapist tell the patient, before therapy begins, of the possibility of disclosure.
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of society had so required.22 The first manifestation of the therapist's ability to
assert his right of disclosure was in the nature of a defense to actions for
violations of the patient's right to privacy and actions for defamation.2"
Eventually, state legislatures, including California's, began to doubt the
plausibility of the patient's action for the violation of his right to privacy, or
his action for defamation, when the patient constituted a threat to society. To
deal with such situations, statutes were enacted which denied the patient
the right to demand that information concerning his potential harm to the
community be kept secret. Such statutes, however, have only applied to
disclosures made during judicial proceedings, not to extrajudicial disclosures
as evidenced in Tarasoff.2" The Tarasoff decision therefore constitutes the
final phase of the transformation from a discretionary right to disclose
where the public is threatened, into a legal duty to make extrajudicial
disclosures to protect potential victims.2"
The case law foundation for the imposition of a legal duty upon the
medical profession to protect the public interest began in 1920, with Simonsen
v. Swenson.2" In Simonsen, the Nebraska supreme court suggested that a
doctor's duty may not end with his patient, but that an additional duty may be
owing to the general public, and in certain circumstances to specific third
persons." The Simonsen court declared that the disclosure to interested
individuals was not a violation of the confidential relationship, since, in
view of the potential harm to the community, the patient could not realistically
expect full confidentiality."
This philosophy of imposing an accountability on the therapist to other
interested members of the public has been recognized by the federal courts
by extending to third persons, who have been violently injured by the
psychotherapist's patient, an action against the psychotherapist based on
the negligent treatment of his patient.29 Two such cases are Merchant's
National Bank v. United States,3" and Underwood v. United States.31 In
22 See note 18 supra.
23 Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d
191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958); Note, Torts--Confidential Communications, 26 ALA. L. REV.
485 (1974).2 4 See, e.g., CAL. EviD. CODE § 1024 (West 1966) (Comment-Law Revision Commis-
sion) which states: "[Ilt is essential that appropriate action be taken if the psychothera-
pist becomes convinced during the course of the treatment that the patient is a menace
to himself or others and the patient refuses to permit the psychotherapist to make the
disclosure necessary to prevent the threatened danger."
25 See generally 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974).
26 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920) (doctor's duty to warn of contagious disease).
27 Id. 28 Id.
29 Fleming & Maximov, supra note 21, at 1029.
30 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967).
31 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966).
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Merchant's National Bank, a veteran's hospital was found liable under the
Federal Torts Claims Act for the wrongful death of a victim of a mental
patient. The patient had been left unrestrained in a work project off the
hospital premises. He left the assigned area and murdered his wife.3 - In
Underwood, also brought under the Federal Torts Claims Act, the Fifth Circuit
found the proximate cause of the death of an ex-wife of a mentally ill airman
to be the negligence of the Air Force in releasing the airman to duty and
allowing him to withdraw a pistol and ammunition. 3 The airman shot
and killed his former wife with the weapon and ammunition so provided.
Tarasoff has echoed the pattern of these decisions by holding the
psychotherapist liable for the violent conduct of his patient. The Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, interpreting
Pennsylvania law in Greenberg v. Barbour,"4 had even extended liability
beyond the scope encountered in Tarasofl, by finding liability predicated upon
the failure to accept a mentally ill person with homicidal tendencies as a
patient.3" Logical reasoning concludes that there should be an even greater
accountability once the incompetent is accepted as a patient in Taraso ff."
The California supreme court, in Tarasoft, achieves the culmination of
the duty of the psychotherapist to warn his patient's potential victims by
combining general tort principles with the trend of the above case law.3"
Justice Tobriner,38 writing for the court, explains that legal duties are merely
"conclusory expressions," and not stable elements of a natural law; and as
such they maintain the requisite flexibility to mold a duty whenever the
plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's
conduct.39 The application of these principles to the psychotherapist-patient
relationship is in accord with the general tort law regarding duties arising from
similar special relationships."° In extending the duties inherent in other
32 272 F. Supp. 409, 418 (D.N.D. 1967). The decision construed North Dakota law,
finding the gross negligence and careless custodial maintenance of the patient to be the
proximate cause of his wife's death. Id. at 421.
as 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966). 34 322 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
35 Id. at 747-48.
36 Fleming & Maximov, supra note 21, at 1029-30.
37 See generally 529 P.2d at 556-60, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 132-36.
38 For Justice Tobriner's personal views regarding the social responsibility of those
rendering public services see Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service
Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CAL. L. REv. 1247 (1967).
31 529 P.2d at 557, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 133. See D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp.
810, 816 (D.R.I. 1973); Dillion v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1968); Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954); Dawidoff, The
Malpractice of Psychiatrists, 1966 DUKE L.J. 696 (1966). But see Zepada v. Zepada, 41
Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963) (all elements of a tort are recognized,
however, social and legal consequences arising from the creation of the new tort prohibit
the granting of a remedy).
40See Singer v. Marx, 144 Cal. App. 2d 637 (1956); Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d
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special relationships to the psychotherapist-patient relationship, the court
takes cognizance of the fulfillment of its dynamic role as part of the common
law system by adapting the law to keep in stride with the demands of
our advancing civilization.41
As a result of the Tarasofi decision, the psychotherapist is confronted by
two converging duties. One is to maintain the confidential relationship as
required by the patient's right to privacy; 42 and the other is to warn potential
victims of any realistic threats of danger.' The "safety zone" for the
psychotherapist lies "in the exercise of reasonable skill and care ordinarily
possessed and exercised by the members of his profession."" As long as the
therapist acts without malice, 5 and uses reasonable care under the cirmum-
stances, 4 he will be able to harmonize his apparently conflicting duties.
The Tarasoff decision, in imposing a duty to warn potential victims, has
marked the zenith of confidentiality that can be awarded the psychotherapist-
patient relationship. As emphasized by Justice Clark's dissent, the policy of
safeguarding the confidential relationship in psychotherapeutic treatment
arises from the necessity of full and free disclosure by the patient if the
results of the treatment are to be effective. 7 Psychotherapy requires the patient
to reveal the entire gamut of his experiences and feelings.4" Without the
legal protection afforded this confidential relationship, the patient may
become inhibited in his disclosures of embarrassing or legally damaging
experiences. 9 Confidentiality has, therefore, been stated to be the sine qua
non of effective treatment."0
Policy arguments similar to those enumerated above have been used to
310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953) (negligent failure to warn the babysitter of a boy's habit of
violently attacking people). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315-324A
(1965).
41 See Rodriquez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 82, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr.
765 (1974).
42 In re Lifshutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
43 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
"529 P.2d at 560, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 136. See also Bardessono v. Micheals, 3 Cal. 3d 780,
478 P.2d 480, 91 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1970).
45 See Swartz v. Thiele, 242 Cal. App. 2d 799, 51 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1966).
46 W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS, § 56 at 43 (4th ed. 1971).
47 Solvenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV.
175, 184 (1960).
48 Id.
41 Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Slovenko, supra note 47,
at 184-87.
10 Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry 92, Report No. 45 (1960) states that:
"[t]he psychiatrist has a special need to maintain confidentiality. His capacity to help
his patients is completely dependent upon their ability and willingness to talk freely....
A threat to secrecy blocks successful treatment."
[Vol. 9:1
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encourage the passage of rules of evidence dealing with the protection of the
psychotherapist-patient relationship."1 Such evidentiary rules grant a privilege
to a specially interested individual (the holder of the privilege) so that he
may, with limited exceptions, prevent the disclosure of confidential information
during a judicial proceeding.'- The sole basis for granting such protection is
that the fostering of the psychotherapist-patient relationship and its inherent
therapeutic value for those in need of psychotherapy is deemed to be of greater
social value than legally requiring the full disclosure of confidential information
at a judicial proceeding.5 ' In considering the scope of the evidentiary
privilege,;' the California Senate Committee on the Judiciary has recognized
that the lack of sufficient guarantees of secrecy is a deterrent to the seeking out
of psychiatric aid." The Committee also concluded that many of the persons
who need the treatment the most are often the first to reject it when secrecy
can no longer be assured.5" As a result of such considerations, many state
legislatures have foreclosed this source of information at judicial proceedings? 7
The policy of protecting the psychotherapist-patient relationship against
the unauthorized divulgence of confidential information during judicial
proceedings has been manifest in the tort area of extrajudicial disclosures by
granting the patient a cause of action against his therapist based on the
patient's right of privacy." The California supreme court, in In re Lishutz9
has recognized that this right of privacy is founded upon constitutional
51 MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 99 at 213, n.9 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
52 See generally PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 501-13.
53 MCCORMICK, supra note 51, § 72, at 152.
54 See generally CAL. Evm. CODE § 1013-24 (West 1966).
55 CAL. EviD. CODE § 1014 (West 1966) (Comment--Senate Committee on Judiciary).
56 Id. Where it is stated:
Many of those persons are seriously disturbed and constitute threats to other
persons in the community.... Although it is recognized that the granting of the
privilege may operate in particular cases to withhold relevant information,
the interests of society will be better served if psychiatrists are able to assure
patients that their confidences will be protected.
57 See note 51 supra; DeWitt, Privileged Communications Between Physician and Patient
23 (1958) who warns that the statutory privilege does not encompass extrajudicial
disclosures by stating:
As far as the statute goes, the physician may talk about the ailments of the patient
from New York to San Francisco and to every Tom, Dick, and Harry on the
street or in his club since the statute merely permits the patient or holder
the privilege to seal the lips of the physician against testifying in a judicial
proceeding, or an investigation authorized by law, and is wholly ineffectual to
prevent a public disclosure elsewhere.
See also Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 709, 287 So. 2d 824, 830 (1973); Note, Torts-
Confidential Communications, 26 ALA. L. REV. 485 (1974).
51 See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio
1965). For other potential grounds for liability for unauthorized disclosure, see
generally Note, Psychiatric Negligence, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 640 (1974).
" 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
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principles"0 as expanded in Griswold v. Connecticut." However, in line with
Tarasoif, the Lilshutz court states that even though a "zone of privacy" '1
protects the psychotherapist-patient relationship, "all interference with such
confidentiality is not prohibited."6 " The Tarasoff court succinctly caps the
expansion of this claim to the right of privacy based on the need for
psychotherapeutic secrecy by declaring that "[tihe protective privilege ends
where the public peril begins."6
CONCLUSION
Even though one out of four hospital beds in this country is occupied by
a schizophrenic,65 the field of psychotherapy continues to progress at a stunted
rate. 6 Authorities have recognized that psychotherapists continue to grossly
overpredict dangerousness in their patients. 7 The impact of the newly created
duty to inform members of the general public of possible threats of violence,
coupled with this gross overprediction of dangerousness may, in the long run,
be a deterrent to the seeking out of psychotherapeutic aid by those who are
most in need.s The implicati, - is that Tarasoff, in terms of medical capabili-
ties, may be ahead of its time. it may validly be asserted that it would be more
beneficial to our society to postpone the duties imposed by this decision until
a time when mental illness is more of a science, and less of a mystery.*
ROBERT E. BURNS
60 See text accompanying note 42 supra.
61381 U.S. 479 (1965). See generally Psychotherapy and Griswold: Is Confidence a
Privilege or a Right? 3 CONN. L. REv. 599 (1971).
62 Id.
63 2 Cal. 3d 415,467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
64 529 P.2d at 561, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
65 Osmundsen, New Unit Formed on Schizophrenia, New York Times, Nov. 27, 1965,
at 28, col. 7.
66 Compare Williams v. LeBar, 141 Pa. 149, 21 A. 525 (1891) (per curiam) with
Steadman & Kevelas, The Community Adjustment and Criminal Activity of the Baxtrom
Patients: 1966-1970, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 80, 83, 304, 307 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Steadman & Kevelas], which reports on an experiment in which 121 adjudicated
"dangerous criminally insane" patients were released from custody and in the four years
following their release there were only nine people arrested, and a total of sixteen
convictions-approximately the same ratio as "normal" people.
67 Steadman & Kevelas, supra note 66.
68 See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
* A rehearing was granted in the Tarasoff case on March 12, 1975. Oral arguments took
place on May 5th before the Supreme Court of California sitting in banc. At the date of
publication, however, no decision had been rendered. See Tarasoff v. Regents of
University of California, Case No. SF23042 (Cal. March 12, 1975).
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